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Abstract 
This paper analyses political debates about civic integration policies in the Netherlands, so as to 
identify different conceptions of the role of the state in ensuring social cohesion by governing 
diversity. Drawing on the literature on party systems, it presents an analysis of political party positions 
on the role of the state in civic integration along two dimensions: economic distribution on the one 
hand, and socio-cultural governance on the other hand. We find that while the large majority of Dutch 
political parties adopt authoritarian positions on the socio-cultural axis in favour of state intervention 
to protect Dutch culture and identity, their positions diverge significantly on the classic economic 
Left-Right dimension. The most contentious issue in Dutch civic integration politics is whether the 
state, the market, or individual migrants should be responsible for financing and organising courses.  
Thus, this paper proposes an innovative model for analysing the politics of citizenship, which enables 
us to comprehend how citizenship policies are shaped not only by views on how identity and culture 
relate to social cohesion, but also by diverging perspectives on socio-economic justice. 
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Introduction 
The mushrooming of civic integration policies is one of the most remarkable trends in migration and 
integration policies in Europe today. While language and integration requirements have long been part 
of many European naturalization procedures, formalised civic integration programs made their 
appearance in Europe in the 1990s. In recent years, a growing number of EU countries have made 
entry and residence rights conditional on participation in or successful completion of civic integration 
courses (Goodman 2010, Jacobs and Rea 2007, Van Oers et al. 2010).  
 Civic integration policies reflect the assumption that state intervention is necessary to 
safeguard the cohesion and regulate the diversity of contemporary European societies. Policymakers 
perceive the consequences of past and present immigration flows as a societal problem which the state 
is to solve. As Ines Michalowski (2009a, p. 23) rightly argues, civic integration policies reveal ‘the 
competence that a state attributes itself in the management of cultural and religious diversity’. 
Studying debates and policies of civic integration allows us to identify different conceptions of the 
role of the state in ensuring social cohesion by governing diversity.  
 Political parties are crucial actors in decision-making processes about citizenship policies. 
However, party politics have been by and large neglected in citizenship studies so far. This paper 
analyses the positions adopted by political parties as to the role the state should play in civic 
integration policies, i.e. in regulating diversity. It does so by drawing on the literature on party 
systems, applying in particular political scientists’ work on issue divides. As we shall see below, the 
analysis by Herbert Kitschelt (2004) of political preference distribution among political parties along 
two issue divides – economic distribution on the one hand, and socio-cultural governance on the other 
– offers important insights when applied to political debates about civic integration policies.   
This paper focuses on political debates in the Netherlands, which was the first European 
country to introduce civic integration policies in the 1990s. These policies have served as a model to 
policymakers throughout Europe. Moreover, in recent years the Netherlands has embarked upon 
reforms which redistributed the responsibility for civic integration among individual, state, and other 
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actors in more radical and innovative ways than any other European country. This paper analyses the 
political debates in which these reforms were shaped, i.e. the parliamentary history of the Law on 
Civic Integration (Wet Inburgering), which Dutch parliamentarians have been debating from 2002 
until the present day. The data consists of 367 documents selected from the parliamentary records 
through keyword search, including government memoranda, legislative proposals, records of 
commission meetings and plenary debates, as well as parliamentary motions, questions and 
amendments. This data was analysed in two complementary ways. First, all statements by political 
parties about the role of the state in civic integration policies were scored, so as to identify their overall 
position in the two-dimensional space of Kitschelt’s model. Second, a qualitative content analysis of 
debates was performed to sustain and refine our interpretation of the positions adopted by the different 
political parties, and to relate these positions to policy changes. 
 The next section provides an overview of the literature on the role of the state in civic 
integration policies and proposes an original perspective on this question drawing on the party systems 
literature. The second section sketches a short history of Dutch civic integration policies, while the 
third section presents the empirical analysis of political party positioning in debates on civic 
integration policies. The fourth concluding section highlights how a party politics approach can 
contribute to our understanding of citizenship policies in Europe.  
 
I. The role of the state in civic integration policies: theoretical approaches 
The proliferation of civic integration courses and tests for immigrants in Europe in the course of the 
last decade has attracted a great deal of academic attention. Many studies offer comparative analyses, 
exploring questions of convergence and divergence, explaining national specificities, or proposing 
modes of categorisation (Bonjour 2010, Carrera 2006, Goodman 2010, 2011, Groenendijk 2011, 
Jacobs and Rea 2007, Joppke 2007a, Van Oers et al. 2010 – see also the PROSINT and INTEC 
projects1) .  
The particular question of the role of the state in civic integration policies has mainly been 
addressed from a normative perspective. There is a lively on-going debate in the literature as to 
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whether or not these new policies of integration and citizenship should be considered ‘liberal’ (Joppke 
2007a, 2007b, Guild et al. 2009, Michalowski 2011, Joppke and Bauböck 2010). Contributors to this 
debate seek to identify the limits of legitimate state intervention in the forging of new citizens. 
Emphasis has mostly been put on the content of civic integration courses and tests, investigating what 
migrants are supposed to learn and whether these requirements transgress the liberal dictum that the 
state respect citizens’ private lives, thoughts and opinions. 
A second line of inquiry in the literature asks not only what but also how migrants are 
expected to learn, i.e. which roles and responsibilities are ascribed to the state, to migrants, and to 
other actors in the process of acquiring the required knowledge and skills. Michalowski (2009b) has 
looked into the privatisation of integration policies in France, Germany and the Netherlands. She 
observes the most far reaching delegation of integration provisions from the state to private actors in 
Dutch policies. Because of this shift of responsibilities from the state not only to the market but also to 
individual migrants, Joppke (2007b, p. 248) and Schinkel and Van Houdt (2010, p. 700) have 
interpreted Dutch civic integration policies as ‘neo-liberal’ policies. Inspired by the governmentality 
literature, these scholars show that while the Dutch state is governing neo-liberally, it is still 
governing. Joppke (2007a, p. 7-8) states that ‘the Dutch state has engaged in a paradoxical double 
move of withdrawal from and increased presence in the integration process’, pushing out 
responsibilities to market and migrants while increasing state coercion. Likewise, Schinkel and Van 
Houdt (2010) describe Dutch citizenship policies since 2000 as an example of ‘repressive 
responsibilization’ which ‘involves the moral education of citizens deemed unable to assume 
responsibility’. 
From these scholars I take the valuable notion that governing ‘neo-liberally’ does not mean 
governing less, but governing differently. Indeed, civic integration policies are based on the notion that 
state intervention is required to govern diversity. Nothing could be further from the Dutch debates and 
policies of civic integration since the turn of the century than a laissez-faire approach to migrant 
incorporation. Government and parliamentary discourse is punctuated with references to the 
‘ambition’ and ‘decisiveness’ that state policies should reflect. What is at stake in political debates 
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about civic integration is not whether the state should intervene, but how. However, the analyses of 
Joppke as well as Schinkel and Van Houdt suffer from a weakness that is common to both the 
governmentality literature and the citizenship literature: a neglect of the party politics through which 
policies are shaped. This failure to identify and account for the different positions adopted by political 
parties obscures the view to crucial dynamics of the decision making process, thereby weakening our 
ability to explain policy change.  
To illustrate the insights we stand to gain by taking party politics into account, the analysis of 
this paper focuses on the positions of Dutch political parties on the role of the state in civic integration 
policies. Political debates about civic integration policies reflect disagreement about how diversity 
should be governed. I contend that the model deployed by Kitschelt (2004) to conceptualise the 
distribution of political preferences allows for identifying with precision what is at stake in these 
political debates, while opening up possibilities for comparison and generalisation. 
Kitschelt (2004, p. 1-2) identifies two ‘lines of issue divides’ which structure the political 
preferences in party systems in postindustrial democracies. The first line concerns economic 
distribution, and refers to what is usually thought of as the classic Left-Right divide: at one extreme 
lies the preference for authoritative redistribution of economic resources among citizens by the state, 
and at the other extreme the preference for economic distribution through voluntary, spontaneous 
market mechanisms. The second line concerns socio-cultural governance and runs from libertarian 
preferences at one extreme to authoritarian preferences at the other extreme. The libertarian position 
puts forward individual autonomy in moral matters, tolerance of socio-cultural differences, and 
individual participation in political processes. The authoritarian position on the other hand calls for 
collectively-shared and uniform norms of conduct and moral codes enforced by a higher authority. 
Norms pertaining to gender, sexuality and family – emphasising individual choice at the libertarian 
end, and conformity to dominant norms at the authoritarian end – are a crucial element in this issue 
line. Both issue lines boil down to preferences about the role of the state, more precisely the extent of 
state intervention or the ‘size’ of the state. The first line of preferences runs from big state to small 
state in matters of economic distribution, while the second line runs from small state to big state in 
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matters of morality and social conduct. As I shall show in the third section, these are exactly the lines 
of conflict which structure debates among Dutch political parties about civic integration policies. 
Kitschelt’s model is different from the two-dimensional model which Pellikaan et al. (2007) 
deploy to analyse the positions of Dutch political parties. Pellikaan et al. position political parties 
along the ‘classic’ axis of economic redistribution on the one hand, and along a new ‘cultural line of 
conflict’ between those who favour a monocultural or a multicultural society on the other hand. In my 
view, Kitschelt’s libertarian-authoritarian axis is a better analytical tool than this cultural conflict line. 
Pellikaan et al argue that the ‘ethic line of conflict’ between political parties who favour a ‘moral 
state’ and those who favour a ‘neutral state’, a core axis in the Dutch political system, has become 
redundant since the 1990s, as progressive issues such as euthanasia and same sex marriage became 
subject to almost consensual political support.  However, as I shall show in the third section of this 
paper, even if there is substantial consensus on progressive values, the divide among Dutch political 
parties regarding whether the state should intervene to impose these values is empirically still highly 
relevant (cf. Duyvendak 2011). Furthermore Kitschelt’s model, in which both axes pertain to the role 
of the state, is more theoretically coherent.  
 
II. A short history of Dutch civic integration policies 
In the early 1990s, the Netherlands started to move away from the ‘ethnic minorities policies’ that had 
given rise to its reputation of a multicultural country. The government opted for an ‘integration policy’ 
that aimed primarily at individual socio-economic independence, rather than at emancipation of 
groups. Cultural matters were considered a private rather than a government concern. The neoliberal 
ideology of ‘individual responsibility’ that had started to shape the reforms of the Dutch welfare state 
since the mid-1980s was now also applied to the field of migrant incorporation, leading to a new 
emphasis on the duties that should accompany rights (Bonjour 2009, p. 192-198, Entzinger 2003, 
Scholten 2007, p. 82-85). 
As part of this shift, the first civic integration policies for newcomers were introduced in 1996 
and laid down in the Law on Civic Integration of Newcomers (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers) of 
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1998. Immigrants – other than labour migrants – were obliged to participate in a Dutch language 
course as well as in societal and professional orientation programs. The municipalities contracted the 
semi-governmental Regional Education Centres (ROCs) to provide the courses, which were free of 
charge for the participants. Failure to participate was sanctioned with a fine. In parallel to this 
obligatory program for newcomers, a voluntary program was set up for so-called ‘oldcomers’ 
(oudkomers), i.e. people of migrant origin who had been living in the Netherlands for some time 
(Commissie Blok 2004, p. 118-124). 
While it is important to note that the introduction of obligatory civic integration policies 
predates the turn of the century, current Dutch civic integration policies can only be understood as part 
of the political response to electoral successes of populist anti-immigrant parties, i.e. of the Lijst Pim 
Fortuyn which obtained 26 out of 150 Lower House seats in 2002, and of Geert Wilders’ Freedom 
Party which obtained 24 seats in 2010. All political parties have since adopted a much more restrictive 
line on migration and integration, so as to let their electorate know that their discontent had been heard 
and understood (Bonjour 2009, p. 243-244).  
In the second Balkenende government – consisting of Christian Democrats, Conservative 
Liberals and Liberal Democrats – which entered office in 2003, the task of responding to what was 
interpreted as the electorate’s call for radical change in the domain of migrant integration was 
entrusted to Rita Verdonk, Conservative Liberal minister of Foreigner Affairs and Integration. She 
first presented her plans for a fundamental revision of civic integration policies to Parliament in April 
2004.2 The legislative proposal for the Law on Civic Integration followed in September 2005 and was 
adopted in November 2006.  
The new Law replaced the obligation to participate in the course by an obligation to pass the 
exam. Failure to pass the exam was sanctioned with a fine and with the denial of a permanent 
residence permit. Also, the target group of obligatory civic integration was expanded from newcomers 
to an estimated 250 thousand ‘oldcomers’. All foreigners who were not educated in the Netherlands 
were obliged to pass the exam, regardless of their length of residence in the Netherlands.   
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Most importantly in the context of this paper, the Law on Civic Integration brought major 
changes to the role and responsibility attributed to the state in implementing civic integration policies. 
The provision of courses was opened up to the ‘free market’: the monopoly of the semi-public 
Regional Education Centres was abolished, so that any organisation or company was allowed to 
provide civic integration courses. In addition, ‘personal responsibility’ was to be a leading principle. 
As a rule, individual participants were to decide for themselves how to prepare for the exam – e.g. in 
which institution to follow courses – and to pay for the courses themselves. Those who could not 
afford to do so could borrow money from the government. Part of the costs (70% with a maximum of 
3000€) would be reimbursed if the exam was passed within three years. Thus, as a general rule, the 
role of the state would henceforth be limited to drafting and administering the exams, and providing 
certain financial facilities. Only for specific groups – unemployed, housewives3, religious ministers 
and newcomers admitted on asylum grounds – were municipalities allowed to select and finance the 
course program. Even these groups were to pay a contribution of 270€ to the costs of the course.  
In the Lower House, there was broad and warm support for fundamental reform of civic 
integration policies. While there were concerns among the opposition about the costs and obligations 
imposed on migrants, all the 150 members of the Lower House eventually voted in favour of the 
government proposal, except for one member of the Liberal Democrat party.4  
Nevertheless, the change of government in 2007 led to significant changes to the Law on 
Civic Integration. The centre-Left cabinet Balkenende IV5, composed of Christian Democrats, Social 
Democrats and the small reformed ChristenUnie, maintained the obligation for newcomers and 
oldcomers to pass the exam, as well as the principle of a free market for civic integration course 
providers. However, the Social-Democrat minister Ella Vogelaar, who replaced Rita Verdonk, 
significantly softened the interpretation of ‘personal responsibility’. She gave municipalities the 
possibility to offer a civic integration provision for free to all participants.6 Although in principle, 
municipalities could still oblige migrants to prepare for the exam through their own means, in practice 
municipalities went on to select and finance the civic integration program for almost everyone. 
Between 2007 and 2009, more than 100 thousand newcomers and oldcomers embarked upon a civic 
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integration program provided by their municipality, while less than 8 thousand persons prepared for 
the exam on their own, making use of the loan and reimbursement facilities available to this effect.7 
Thus, the role of the municipality in implementing civic integration policies had been restored to its 
old state.  
However, the current Conservative Rutte government, which is composed of Conservative 
Liberals and Christian Democrats with minority support from the populist anti-immigrant Freedom 
Party and entered office in 2010, has presented a proposal to reform the Law on Civic Integration once 
again, so as to reinstate the principle that migrants are to select and finance civic integration courses 
themselves, with state assistance limited to providing loan facilities for those with insufficient 
financial resources.8  
 
III. Political parties’ positions on governing diversity 
 
The distribution of political party preferences in debates about civic integration 
Political debates about civic integration policies are about if and how the state should intervene to 
regulate the diversity and protect the cohesion of society. Figure 1 below shows the positions adopted 
by Dutch political parties in these debates, along the two axes that make up Kitschelt’s two-
dimensional model: state intervention in socio-cultural matters on the vertical axis, and state 
intervention in economic redistribution on the horizontal axis.  
 Party positions in this figure are based on an analysis of statements about the role of the state 
made by political parties in debates about civic integration between July 2002 and September 2011. A 
total of 379 statements about economic distribution and 116 statements about socio-cultural 
governance were scored on a scale ranging from -2 (small state) to +2 (big state).  
On the economic dimension, political parties statements’ were scored negatively according to 
the extent to which they favoured free market mechanisms, financial responsibility for the individual 
migrant, and minimal involvement of municipalities, or emphasised duties, responsibilities, and the 
strength and capacities of migrants. Statements were scored positively according to the extent to which 
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they opposed free market mechanisms, favoured state financing of courses and extensive involvement 
of municipalities, or emphasised rights and the vulnerable position of migrants.  
My operationalization of the second issue divide identified by Kitschelt (2004) begs further 
explanation. This issue divide pertains to whether the state should play a role in socio-cultural matters, 
enforcing collective moral norms en social codes, or whether morality and life style should be left to 
individual choice. The libertarian position, which favours a small state in moral matters, is usually 
associated with progressive values such as gender equality, gay rights, and positive evaluation of 
cultural diversity (cf. Flanagan and Lee 2003). However, this is not necessarily true in the Dutch case. 
As Duyvendak (2004) has noted, issues that are highly contentious among the population of many 
other countries – gay rights, women’s emancipation, non-authoritarian styles of upbringing of 
children, freedom of religion and opinion – are broadly supported among the Dutch population. These 
progressive values have become part of the dominant majority culture and national self-image, and are 
frequently contrasted in political discourse with the supposedly conflicting values of the ‘Muslim’ 
migrant population (Duyvendak 2004, Mepschen et al. 2010). With the exception of two small 
Christian parties, all political parties in the Netherlands warmly support progressive values. However, 
as Duyvendak (2011) also shows, notwithstanding this substantial consensus, the question of ‘how to 
deal with those who don’t share “modern” values polarizes the political spectrum as nothing else’. The 
issue divide on socio-cultural governance remains relevant: the question is still whether the state 
should intervene to strengthen or enforce the dominance of this ‘Dutch’ corpus of progressive values 
in society or not, i.e. whether the role of the state in moral matters should be big or small.  
Therefore, in figure 1, political parties’ statements are scored positively on the socio-cultural 
dimension according to the extent to which they favour a substantive shared identity based on a 
uniform set of values and cultural practices, as well as state intervention to enforce adherence to a 
common identity, values and culture. Statements in favour of a big state in moral matters are classified 
as authoritarian, even if the values and cultural practices that the state is to protect reflect progressive 
values usually associated with the libertarian position. Statements are scored negatively according to 
the extent to which they favour multiple identities and diversity of values and cultures, and if they 
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reject state intervention in matters of identity, values, and culture – even if this state intervention aims 
at protecting progressive values. 
 
Figure 1 : Distribution of Political Party Preferences in Parliamentary Debates about Civic Integration 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that indeed, positions on socio-cultural governance still reflect a relevant issue divide. 
There is a significant distance between the populist Freedom Party which wants the state to enforce 
Dutchness as a Leitkultur on the one end of the spectrum, and the Liberal Democrats who resent state-
imposed uniformity in beliefs and behaviour on the other end. However, most Dutch political parties 
are positioned in the upper half of this quadrant. The Greens and the Liberals, which are the only 
parties which take up libertarian positions, both won 10 seats out of the 150 seats in the Lower House 
in the elections of 2010. The reformed ChristenUnie, which adopts a neutral position, has only 2 seats. 
Although to different degrees, a very large majority among Dutch politicians support interventionist 
policies aimed at a shared identity, value system, and culture. 
 Duyvendak (2011) is right to state that moral and cultural governance remains a contentious 
issue among Dutch political parties, but not that it ‘polarizes the political spectrum as nothing else’ 
(emphasis added). Figure 1 shows that the most contentious issue in Dutch political debates about 
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civic integration is not the role of the state in cultural matters, but the role of the state in economic 
distribution, i.e. the division of responsibilities for the provision and financing of civic integration 
courses among state, market, and migrants. The Dutch political spectrum is deeply and and rather 
equally divided: on the one hand, the Freedom Party, the Conservative Liberals and the Christian 
Democrats want civic integration courses to be provided by commercial actors, and purchased by 
individual migrants, with state involvement limited to setting standards for the exam and (if necessary) 
providing loan facilities. On the other hand, the Social Democrats, Socialist Party, Greens and Liberal 
Democrats want civic integration to be organised and financed (primarily) by the state.  
The following two parts of this section present the results of a complementary qualitative 
content analysis of political debates, aimed first at a more refined interpretation of the positions 
adopted by different political parties, and second at relating these positions to the policy reforms 
implemented by successive Dutch governments since 2002.  
 
The first issue divide: economic distribution 
Ever since Dutch political parties started debating the Law on Civic Integration in the early 2000s, the 
most contentious issue has been the role of the state in economic distribution, i.e. whether the state 
should intervene to protect and assist the (financially) weak in society. On the side of this issue divide 
which favours a ‘small state’ in matters of economic redistribution in civic integration policies, we 
find the Conservative Liberals, the Christian Democrats, and the populist anti-immigrant Freedom 
Party. These parties’ views are reflected in the policies of the Balkenende II and Rutte I governments. 
Doing away with the semi-public monopoly on the provision of civic integration courses and 
opening the market was expected to enhance the diversity ant the quality of the courses and to lower 
the prices. As a Conservative Liberal MP argued: ‘People are different and may have different 
demands. (…) If the market is good at anything, it is at making supply meet demand. (…) This will 
probably lower the costs too’.9 The Christian Democrats took up a relatively moderate position, stating 
that the government should play a role in assuring that the courses met certain quality standards. This 
government involvement would not eliminate the responsibility of either business or individual 
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migrants however: the minister was to develop these standards ‘together with business organisations’ 
and migrants should retain the possibility to opt for an uncertified course provider: ‘in the end, this is 
the candidate’s own responsibility’.10 
‘Individual responsibility’ has been a mantra in Dutch migrant incorporation policies since the 
early 1990s. However, the Conservative Liberals, Christian Democrats, and Freedom Party have 
pushed for a more radical interpretation of this mantra, in which migrants would be expected to 
prepare for the civic integration exam on their own, with only limited financial state assistance. As 
Minister Verdonk argued, ‘personal responsibility yields the best results. It stimulates people to get 
busy themselves and to find the best way to prepare for the civic integration exam’.11 No longer should 
migrants be treated as ‘care categories that need to be taken by the hand by the government’.12 
Likewise, Conservative Liberal parliamentarians pled for breaking with the policies of the past, when 
‘civic integration was in the hands of social workers and as long as civic integration remains a matter 
of social assistance, continuous failure (…) is rewarded with extra attention’.13 Piet Hein Donner, 
Christian Democrat minister responsible for integration policies in the Rutte government, deplored 
that ‘citizens are put more and more in the position of consumer and client of public services, and less 
and less in the position of involved and responsible citizen’.14 A Christian Democrat MP pled for ‘a 
demanding integration policy, where people are not seen as victims but as responsible individuals who 
are capable of shaping their existence and are not victims of circumstances’.15 A Freedom Party MP 
expressed a similar view in more blunt terms: ‘People just need to get a kick in their ass and get to 
work. (…) That’s why we are very pleased that this government starts from the individual 
responsibility of people’.16  
The Christian Democrats again take up a more moderate position than the Conservative 
Liberals and the Freedom Party, in that they deem a certain level of state assistance necessary for 
particularly disadvantaged groups. The Christian Democrats therefore supported the exception made to 
the principle of ‘personal responsibility’ for asylum seekers, unemployed people and housewives, who 
should be offered a civic integration course by their municipality.17 
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On the other side of this issue divide, we find the Social Democrats, the Greens, the Socialist 
Party, and the Liberal Democrats, who favour a ‘big state’ in matters of economic distribution in civic 
integration policies. The views of these parties are reflected in the policies of the Balkende IV 
government, in which the Christian Democrats participated but Social Democrat ministers were 
responsible for civic integration policies.  
From the first debates on the Law on Civic Integration, the Social Democrats had criticized 
minister Verdonk’s plans: 
 
The responsibility of the government is marginalised in these proposals. The newcomer is left to find 
his way between legal obligation and market mechanisms. Individual responsibility is primary in our 
vision too, but as new citizens of our country they must also be enabled to participate.18  
 
In a similar vein, the Greens argued that ‘the obligation to learn must be met by the right to 
education’.19 The Liberal Democrats stated that ‘considering the efforts that people make, [the state] 
has a duty to provide’.20 Likewise, the Socialist Party argued that ‘if you introduce an obligation, the 
migrant (…) at least has a right to a good and fitting [civic integration] provision’.21 This criticism 
increased as the first results of the Law on Civic Integration proved severely disappointing, with the 
number of persons embarking on a civic integration course dropping from 30 thousand to 10 thousand 
in the first year after the Law entered into force.22  
 In response, the Social Democrat minister Ella Vogelaar, responsible for civic integration 
policies in the fourth Balkenende government, decided that municipalities would once again be 
allowed to offer a course to any member of the target group, not just to the ‘special’ categories. In 
explaining why she chose to ‘shift the responsibility for providing a course to municipalities’, minister 
Vogelaar wrote: ‘the personal responsibility of applicants remains fully valid on a number of points, 
but what is at stake is finding the proper balance between this personal responsibility and the societal 
interest of having as many people as possible doing civic integration. In the Law on Civic Integration, 
this balance was insufficiently found’.23 Thus, the role of the municipalities in the provision of civic 
integration courses was fully restored. No formal changes were made to the free market provision of 
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courses, but in practice the municipalities became almost the only buyer on the market.24 The state 
may no longer have had a monopoly on the offer, but it had a virtual monopoly of the demand, thereby 
retrieving significant control over the market.  
If these politicians favoured a bigger role for the state, it was because they considered the 
target group of civic integration a vulnerable group. Minister Vogelaar wrote:  
 
If the government gives the impression that it will take care of everything, citizens will not feel called 
upon to do much themselves. On the other hand, if the government leaves everything to citizens, it is 
likely that only those with the necessary competences will manage to get things well organized.25  
 
In other words, this government thought only a very specific part of the target group fitted the profile 
of able and autonomous citizens that underlay the original Law on Civic Integration. For the rest of the 
target group, state provisions were deemed necessary. The Social Democrats stated that ‘responsibility 
must be placed where it can factually be carried; this involves capacities and financial resources’, 
arguing that they knew ‘from experience that these target groups in particular need some guidance to 
be able to carry this responsibility’.26 Similarly, the Socialists claimed that ‘the target group of this law 
is one that needs good guidance to be able to carry personal responsibility’.27 Thus, these politicians 
wanted the state to provide and care for weaker groups in society, so as to redistribute economic 
resources in society more evenly.  
It is this opposition between the preferences of Christian Democrats, Conservative Liberals, 
and Freedom Party on the one hand, and Social Democrats, Liberal Democrats, Greens and Socialist 
Party on the other hand, which explains the reforms to the Law on Civic Integration implemented 
successively by the centre-Right Balkenende II government, the centre-Left Balkenende IV 
government, and the current Conservative Rutte government.   
 
The second issue divide: socio-cultural governance 
In debates about civic integration policies, most Dutch political parties position themselves 
somewhere on the authoritarian side of the socio-cultural governance axis. The strongest authoritarian 
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positions are predictably adopted by the Freedom Party, closely followed by the Conservative 
Liberals: they want to protect ‘Dutch’ identity and disseminate ‘Dutch’ values among the migrant 
population through state policies. The Conservative Liberals consider ‘compliance with fundamental 
values and the codes of conduct which result from these values a condition for successful 
integration’.28 They claim that ‘the Conservative Liberal message about integration is really quite 
simple. If you come to the Netherlands, you adapt (…)’.29 The Freedom Party takes up a similar 
position in stating that ‘the Netherlands has only one dominant, leading culture’ and that ‘people who 
settle in the Netherland must adapt to Dutch society’.30  
 The position of the Christian Democrats is more moderately authoritarian, and characterised 
by a certain tension. On the one hand, as early as 2000, the Christian Democrat party leader pled for a 
‘normative government’ which was to conduct civic integration policies aimed at ensuring that 
migrants ‘appropriate the value pattern and public consciousness’ which ‘makes up the dominant 
culture’.31 Since then, Christian Democrat MPs have continued asking migrants to ‘internalise and 
express’ Dutch norms and values.32 This position fits with the conservative ideology of the Christian 
Democrats which favours a collective morality which outweighs individual preferences. However, it 
contrasts with the traditional Christian Democrat preference for self-determination and freedom from 
state intervention for religious communities. This latter tradition is reflected in statements such as the 
following: 
 
Integration does not imply that one join some kind of majority culture. Especially in our 
country, there is so much cultural plurality – also within and between groups of native citizens 
– that one can hardly speak of a majority culture. (…) Cultural uniformity fits better with a 
dictatorship.33  
 
Reconciling these two contradictory views is a constant and enduring struggle for the Dutch Christian 
Democrats. Overall however, the authoritarian view has clearly dominated Christian Democratic 
discourse over the last decade.  
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The preference of the Conservative Liberals and Christian Democrats for a thick moral 
identity disseminated through state policies is reflected in the positions adopted by the Balkenende II 
and Rutte governments. Conservative Liberal Minister Verdonk argued that ‘sharing dominant norms 
and fundamental values is vital for participation’ in Dutch society.34 The terms of the exam on 
Knowledge of Dutch Society which Verdonk introduced in 2006 include the requirement that the 
migrant understand that ‘Dutch people can be very direct, without intending to be offensive or 
impolite’ and therefore ‘do not take direct feedback and criticism personally’. The successful 
candidate would also make appointments before visiting acquaintances, know when to draw a number 
in a shop, and warn the neighbours before organising a party.35 The current Rutte government reflects 
the positions the Christian Democrat and Conservative Liberal coalition parties, but also of the 
Freedom Party which lends it minority support, when it states that ‘society rests on a fundamental 
continuity in values, opinions, institutions and habits which form the leading culture’ and that ‘the 
concept of civic integration is based on the idea that Dutch society is not a random collection of people 
who live here, but a community of citizens with a shared language, values and opinions’. ‘Solidarity’, 
the government states, ‘implies that fundamental values are shared’, i.e. ‘not abstractions, but the 
values which are expressed in manners, modes of life, and in the goals and ways of operating of 
organisations’.36  
Authoritarian positions are not limited to the Right half of the Dutch political spectrum 
however. On the far-Left, the Socialist Party adopts a moderately authoritarian position. The Socialists 
are in favour of a ‘big’ state in terms of policy intervention in moral values and social codes. They 
argue that ‘learning the written and unwritten rules of society is indispensable’ and that ‘lack of 
knowledge of Dutch customs’ leads to ‘isolation’.37  
Likewise, the Social Democrats take up a moderate authoritarian position which has recently 
become more pronounced. In a speech in 2002, a Social Democrat MP declared that the state may 
impose certain forms of conduct, but not thoughts since ‘thoughts are free’.38 In 2003, Social 
Democrats criticized minister Verdonk for ‘steering towards monomania’.39 Such statements reflect 
the positive valuation of cultural diversity and individual emancipation which have been recurring 
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themes in Social Democrat discourse since the 1980s. In 2008 however, Social Democrats argued that 
‘we must stand for these core values in the Netherlands. Everyone must support them actively. That is 
the purpose of civic integration. Everyone who comes here, must support the values’.40 Most recently, 
a Social Democrat MP declared: 
 
Each society has its values (…) rooted in history. They are about how we behave towards each other, 
about what we share. It is good that [the Rutte government] wants to emphasise this as a starting point 
of its policy. (…) 
I am convinced that it is important to make explicit what values tie this society together: this is who we 
are, this is how things work here, and join! If you make an effort, you are very welcome. Progressive 
views, individualisation, the expectation that you will do anything you can to strive for your own 
success, taking responsibility for your environment. Whoever participates in that, can count on our 
sympathy, regardless of their origin.41  
 
Thus, the Social Democrats have come to share the same authoritarian position on the socio-cultural 
axis as the Christian Democrats.  
The views expressed by the centre-Left Balkenende IV government reflect the more moderate 
authoritarian position of the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats, as well as the internal 
tensions which characterise the discourses of both these parties. On the one hand, the government 
‘realises that it is not always possible or necessary to agree on all differences in conduct and opinions. 
The individual freedom to live according to one’s own views and ambitions is of great value’.42 But on 
the other hand, the government declared that ‘social integration (…) requires a shared pattern of values 
and norms – identification with society, respect for fundamental rights, but also agreeing on street 
rules’.43 Similarly, it wrote that ‘civic integration and education must equip everyone in our country to 
shape their lives with due observance of [progressive gender and family] values’.44  
 The only Dutch political parties which have positioned themselves on the libertarian side of 
this issue divide are the Greens and the Liberal Democrats. Both parties are warmly in favour of 
women and gay emancipation, out of a concern for the emancipation of individuals from group 
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pressure of any kind. Out of this same concern, they shrink from the idea of uniform morals and codes 
of conduct and – especially – from state intervention to enforce such values and codes. Thus the 
Greens have criticized the Christian Democrats for suggesting that there is ‘one single Dutch cultural 
identity’ and have asked the government to replace the questions in the civic integration exam about 
‘non-static codes of conduct, norms and values’ by ‘knowledge about the Dutch constitution’.45 Most 
explicit and fervent in their rejection of the authoritarian positions adopted by the other political 
parties were the Liberal Democrats. They declared: 
 
We mustn’t consider people primarily as members of a group, but as individuals, and treat them as 
such. We must cherish diversity. There must be rehabilitation for tolerance. Let’s not draw narrow 
boundaries to what is normal. A definition of normalcy is never a good starting point for shaping a 
dynamic society.46 
 
In a recent debate, a Liberal Democrat MP criticised the Rutte government policies thus: 
 
[It seems] the multicultural society will be abolished by state decree. I ask the minister how much 
further the state will intrude into the private lives of people. Actively countering multiculturality is 
naïve and anti-liberal. To which extent does the state define the norm, and where do the boundaries 
lie?47 
Thus, the Greens and the Liberal Democrats are the only Dutch political parties to favour a small state 
in matters of identity, moral values and social conduct.  
 
IV. Political party preferences on governing diversity: two lines of conflict 
The two-dimensional model proposed by Herbert Kitschelt is an incisive tool to analyse political 
debates about governing diversity. It enables us to show that the large majority of Dutch political 
parties position themselves on the authoritarian side of the socio-cultural governance axis, favouring 
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state policies which strive to affect citizens’ identity, values, and manners. Only the Greens and the 
Liberal Democrats have adopted the libertarian position that moral values and social conduct should 
be left to individual choice rather than government policies. Together, these parties represent 20 seats 
out of 150 in the Lower House since the 2010 elections, i.e. a relatively small minority in Dutch 
politics. The large majority of Dutch politicians wants to use civic integration policies to stimulate 
migrants to embrace Dutch values, behave according to ‘Dutch’ ways, and identify with the 
Netherlands. The assumption that the preservation of social cohesion requires a certain degree of 
socio-cultural homogeneity among the population, and that the state should intervene to maintain or 
restore this homogeneity, is broadly shared among Dutch political parties. This explains the 
observation by several scholars that Dutch civic integration policies since 2003 reflect a ‘thick’ 
conception of government, i.e. a government that pushes or requires its citizens to adopt specific 
values and forms of conduct (Spijkerboer 2007, p. 49-52, Michalowski 2011).  
 When it comes to the role of the state in economic distribution however, Dutch political 
parties are much more divided. Those which favour a small role for the state and want the (financial) 
responsibility for acquiring the required knowledge and skills to be attributed to individual migrants 
and the market, i.e. Conservative Liberals, Christian Democrats, and Freedom Party, obtained 76 out 
of 150 seats in the Lower House in the 2010 elections. The parties which favour a bigger redistributive 
role for the state, i.e. which want the state to care for vulnerable groups in society by providing civic 
integration policies, represent almost half of the House – more than half in fact between 2002 and 
2006. This explains why this aspect of Dutch civic integration policies is subject to frequent change: 
the responsibility for organising and financing courses has been shifted from the state to the market 
and migrants or back by each new government which entered office since 2003.  
 Kitschelt’s preference distribution model offers an innovative, comprehensive way of 
understanding political dynamics in the field of citizenship and migrant incorporation.  It is a dynamic 
model, in that it offers insight into interactions between political actors as well as policy change. 
Moreover, it broadens our analytical perspective on the politics of citizenship. It enables us to 
comprehend how citizenship policies are shaped not only by views on the relation between identity, 
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culture, and social cohesion, but also by diverging perspectives on socio-economic justice and welfare 
state retrenchment. 
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